Insurance Against the Overreaching of Sovereignty by Finn, John F. X.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 25 Issue 3 Article 1 
1956 
Insurance Against the Overreaching of Sovereignty 
John F. X. Finn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John F. X. Finn, Insurance Against the Overreaching of Sovereignty, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 409 (1956). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol25/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
INSURANCE AGAINST THE OVERREACHING
OF SOVEREIGNTY*
JOHN F. X. FINNt
"We have staked the whole future of this country, not upon the ptwer of
government, far from it. We have staked the future of American civilization
upon the capacity of mankind for self-government."
-JA ES ADISON
I. INTRODUCTION
F ROMI time immemorial sovereignties have reached out to regulate in-
dustries affected with a public interest. And from time immemorial
industry has inquired as to the jurisdiction of sovereignty. Has it gone
too far? Is government overreaching? And if so, what, if anything, can
be done about it? Nowhere is the quest for answers to such inquiries
more intriguing than in the twilight zones of federalism and the shadowy
boundaries between state and nation.
A. Armstrong Committee Investigation
Fifty years ago the sovereign state of New York reached into the life
insurance industry of that state and set its house in order by the investi-
gation and Report of the Armstrong Committee,' with specific recom-
mendations for legislation which were duly enacted into law. Such
enactments had a profound effect, not only on New York life insurance
companies but on foreign companies admitted to do business in New
York and upon the insurance laws of many other jurisdictions.
In retrospect none will say that in the light of the business conditions
of 1906 such a visitation of sovereignty was not wholesome and beneficial,
however much there may be disagreement here and there with the rigor
of one recommendation or another, or with the anachronism of continuing
1906 safeguards in modern 1956.
B. Temporary National Economic Committee Investigation
In 1939, a special committee, appointed by Congress to investigate
concentration of economic power,' spent considerable time examining the
* Substance of a speech given by the late John F. X. Finn, former Dean, Fordham
University School of Law, on August 28, 1956, at the 79th Annual Meeting of the American
Bar Association.
Coordinator of the Fordham Development Fund and Lincoln Square Project. Pro-
fessor, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Legislative Insurance Investigating Committee, Report (1905).
2. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1906, c.326, at 763-830.
3. Pub. Res. 113, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
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insurance business, especially the life insurance business. Investigators
combed through files of companies and insurance trade associations and
numerous executives were called to Washington to testify. Although the
examination set out to find whatever evils it could the dearth of evil led
to a paucity of result.4
Over the years there have been other instances in which sovereignties
have come into close official contact with the insurance industry. Recent
examples are found in the areas of (a) investments in common stock, (b)
acquisition of real estate, (c) welfare plans, (d) variable annuities, (e)
taxation of life insurance companies, (f) in proposals for sovereign in-
demnity for a portion of industrial liability to the public arising from
the construction or operation of facilities for the development of atomic
energy, and (g) regulation of insurance company advertising.
a. Investments in common stock
Only this year, when the Connecticut General Life Insurance Com-
pany, chartered in Connecticut, and authorized to do business in New
York, sought to acquire 80% of the outstanding capital stock of National
Fire Insurance Company, likewise chartered in Connecticut and licensed
to do business in the State of New York, the sovereignty forbade the
acquisition.' The New York Attorney General wrote an opinion in which
he stated that if the proposed common stock acquisition of the Fire
Insurance Company by the Life Insurance Company was consummated,
the Superintendent of Insurance would be acting within his authority in
determining that the Life Insurance Company would not qualify to do
business in the State.6 This determination undoubtedly reflected the
continuing influence of the perspective of the Armstrong Report7 and
of such a decision as Firemen's Insurance Co. v. Beha,8 in which
it was held that an insurance company, which invested in the common
stock of other insurance companies a sum of money which was more than
its entire surplus, had not complied with former section 56 of the New
York Insurance Law9 in that such investments were held not to have been
of the same general character required of domestic companies. Never-
theless, the Connecticut General Life Insurance Company strenuously
urged that, in its case, disallowance of so-called ineligible investments
4. Hearings Before the Temporary National Economic Committee of the Senate, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess., pts. 10, 13, 28 (1938).
5. - Ops. Att'y Gen. - (1956).
6. See N.Y. Insurance Law § 42.
7. Cf. the reference to "flagrant abuses" in Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Bohlinger, 308
N.Y. 174, 183, 124 N.E. 2d 110, 114 (1954).
8. 30 F. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1928).
9. See note 6 supra.
[Vol. 25
OVERREACHING OF SOVEREIGNTY
would still leave the company in a sound financial condition as measured
by New York standards, and that its proposed acquisition of 80% or
more of the capital stock of the Fire Insurance Company would not
be in violation of the New York Insurance Law.
Perhaps the strength of this argument is reflected in the report of the
New York Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regula-
tion, in which the Committee stated:
"The subject of investments is still a vital one and presents a problem which requires
continuous study and eamination .... It was not anticipated that the 1951 amend-
ments would solve the problem for all time. The very nature of investment in a
fluctuating economy dictates otherwise. ... We feel that those advocating a new
'basket' provision should be afforded an opportunity to present their views. It may
well be that some suitable amendment can be devised which will not impair the
financial structure of the insurers or lessen the confidence of the insuring public in
the stability of the insurance companies .... New problems or old problems in a new
dress affecting the business of insurance have risen. All are of importance and require
legislative attention if not actual legislation."10
Manifestly, the spirit of this report is one of cooperation and good will
to the industry. It is the very antithesis of overreaching. That suggests
the happy possibility that if in the future another Connecticut General
case comes into focus it will be dealt with more understandingly.
b. Acquisition of Real Estate
Rarely has the clash between sovereignty and management been more
vividly highlighted than in the case of Guardian Life Insurance Co. v.
Bohlinger.11 In that case the insurance company purchased real estate
which it considered "an ideal spot for an investment in an office building"
and it purchased the property for "rental", but with the thought in mind
of designing the building so that it could be used for its accounting
activities and for temporary storage of its records. The New York Super-
intendent of Insurance decided that the company's acquisition was not
for the "convenient accommodation" of its business and accordingly
refused to approve the purchase.
The administrative determination was reviewed right up to the highest
court of the state and that court affirmed the Superintendent's annulment
of the purchase, affirming the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court,'
which had acted by a divided court. Mr. Justice Dore, dissenting in the
Appellate Division, urged that although the insurance business is
"affected by public interest and therefore required regulation," never-
theless, "reasonable regulation in the public interest is one thing. Man-
10. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 40 (1956).
11. 308 N.Y. 174, 124 N.E. 2d 110 (1954).
12. 284 App. Div. 110, 130 N.Y.S. 2d 705 (1st Dep't 1954).
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agement and complete right to control business policy placed in the hands
of a single administrator is quite another; and, if permitted, would tend
to take the private property in question and make the insurance business
pro tanto a matter of state ownership and dominion."' 3 But the highest
court held otherwise, and ruled that to the extent indicated, management
policy is to be determined by the state, and not by industry.
Another facet of the Guardian Life case was the determination of the
New York Court of Appeals that the Superintendent's ruling was not
subject to more than what was called "threshold judicial review,"
and that the legislature in effect provided that an administrative action
is not open to judicial review when it fails to say affirmatively that the
right to such review exists. This sent the industry to the legislature
for procedural relief, and as a result section 34 of the New York In-
surance Law was amended as of April 21, 1956, to provide that any order
of the Superintendent is judicially reviewable, whether or not a specific
grant of judicial review is set forth in various sections of the statute.14
Turning now to an instance of supervision by sovereignty of a subject
matter in which the insurance industry has a cognate though not a direct
interest, we touch upon the subject of welfare plans.
c. Welfare Plans
A bill has been introduced in the United States Senate 1' which would
require registration by all types of employee welfare and pension benefit
plans covering 25 or more employees, and in case of employers with 100
or more employees the bill would require the filing of annual reports.
This bill, called a "Disclosure Bill" rather than a "Regulatory Bill", was
introduced against a factual background indicating that over 75,000,000
persons are now covered in some measure by employee welfare fund
programs. Annual contributions to them total more than $6.8 billion,
and pension reserves have been piled up in the amount of $20 million
to $25 million. 6
It is true that the bill calls for disclosure by others than insurance
companies, but the insurance industry must be interested in Senator
Douglas' statement that:
"The agency charged with administration of the act under this bill would be the
Securities and Exchange Commission, although the subcommittee found this allocation
of responsibility its most difficult decision.' 7
13. Id. at 119, 130 N.Y.S. 2d at 713.
14. N.Y. Insurance Law § 34.
15. S.3873, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
16. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Welfare and Pension Plans In-
vestigation 2 (1956).
17. 102 Cong. Rec. 7477 (daily ed. May 17, 1956).
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Similarly, the insurance industry must be interested in the fact that the
federal sovereignty in the person of the SEC has been scrutinizing
variable annuities.
d. Variable Annuities
On June 19, 1956, the Securities and Exchange Commission began a
court test in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
by seeking an injunction to halt the sale of annuity policies by the
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company, with headquarters in Wash-
ington. The contention of the SEC apparently is that under variable
annuity contracts the company is not obligated to pay a fixed sum periodi-
cally, as are issuers of conventional annuities, and since the company's
contract calls for the periodic payment of sums varying in amount (depend-
ing upon the value of an underlying fund invested in common stocks or in
other equity-type investments) the SEC claims that the company's con-
tract is an investment contract and a certificate of interest or partici-
pation in a profit-sharing agreement within the definition of the term
"security" contained in the Securities Act of 1933.18 Hence the offer of
sale of such a contract, according to the SEC, is subject to the registra-
tion provisions of the act. The Insurance Company contends, on the
other hand, that variable annuities are a relatively new form of life in-
surance contract. It argues, therefore, that since it is insurance business,
like every other insurance business it should be regulated in accordance
with the laws of the forty-eight states and the territories, under the
supervision of the insurance commissioners of those sovereign juris-
dictions.
e. Taxation of Life Insurance Companies
1. Federal
On March 13, 1956, a direct impact by sovereignty upon the insurance
industry was made by the enactment of the Life Insurance Company Tax
Act, 9 which provides a tax on life insurance companies for the year
1955. It has been called a "stopgap" bill, and in this connection the Sec-
retary of the Treasury has stated:
"I suggest that an attempt be made to develop a method of taxing life insurance
companies like other business, on the basis of their entire income from all sources, vith
appropriate deductions for their expenses and additions to their reserves against policy
contracts ... "20
It is estimated that the tax imposed on life insurance companies for the
calendar year 1955 under this act will be $248,000,000. If the life
18. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b (1951).
19. Pub. L. No. 429, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. § 801 (March 13, 156).
20. U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1056 (1956).
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insurance companies had continued to pay taxes under the formula in
effect in 1954 the tax on 1955 income would have been $197,000,000.1
Hence there is an indicated increase in taxes of $51,000,000.
2. State
In addition to the revenue collected from insurance companies fed-
erally, all states now impose a gross premium tax, which is, in effect,
a gross receipts tax. The amount collected in 1955, from life insurance
companies alone, was $189 million, or almost double the amount paid
a decade ago.2
Several states, in addition to imposing this gross receipts tax on in-
surance premiums, apply it also to considerations which the companies
receive for annuity contracts. This is even more unfair than the heavy
increase in the tax on insurance premiums. Most annuity contracts are
now issued in connection with employee benefit plans and frequently this
tax is greater than all the other administrative costs of the plans. Since
non-insured plans are not subject to this tax, the price differential it
causes tends to dry up the annuity business which the insurance com-
panies legitimately should have, and it is encouraging employers, particu-
larly small employers, to use self-administered plans, which frequently
are not as desirable from the security viewpoint as the annuity con-
tracts issued by the life insurance companies.
f. Federal Indemnity for Industrial Liability Arising
from Development of Atomic Energy.
In the atomic energy field a bill has been introduced in Congress 23
which would encourage and facilitate the development by industry of the
peaceful use of atomic energy. This bill would authorize the Atomic
Energy Commission until August 1, 1966, to enter into agreements of
indemnification with those contractors whom the Commission may
require to provide financial protection to cover liability claims arising
out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive or other
hazardous properties of nuclear materials. It would also authorize the
Commission to indemnify the contractor against such claims for sums
above the amount of the financial protection required, but not in excess
of $500,000,000. The bill provides that:
"(g) In the administration of indemnity agreements entered into hereunder, the Com-
mission shall use, to the maximum extent practicable, the facilities and services of
private insurance companies and established insurance adjustment organizations and
the Commission may contract to pay a reasonable compensation for such services....
21. S. Rep. No. 1571, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1956).
22. Institute of Life Insurance, Life Insurance Fact Book 53 (1956).
23. H.R. 11523, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) ; S.3929, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
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"(h) The Commission shall have authority to settle or approve the settlement of
claims without regard to the rules of legal liability in the State of the accident, and
regardless of whether liability has been established by the judgment of any court."-
This proposed legislation raises a myriad of legal problems, including
possible constitutional questions with respect to the placing of a limit
on total tort liability to the public on the part of a given individual or
firm. In the Congressional Record the following discussion appears:
"Mr. Pastore. Is not the Senator pretty well convinced that the only way vwe can
overcome the insurance obstacle is by government participation?
Mr. Gore. I reluctantly come to that conclusion.
Mr. Pastore. No matter how we look at it there has got to be government partici-
pation. We may as well come to that understanding as quickly as we can, and
definitely advance a program which will carry out the spirit and the intent of the
1954 law.
Mr. Gore. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, as I have said, it seems to me we have here a perfect example of the
classic role of Government to do for its people that which they as individuals cannot
do for themselves or that which they cannot do as well or as expeditiously for them-
selves .. .This is no time for arguments about the exclusion of either the govern-
ment or private enterprise from the field of reactor development. The task ahead
presents a challenge which will require the full resources of both. -3
Thus the spirit of this atomic energy proposal is that the sovereignty
and the insurance industry work hand in hand. - " Such a spirit has in the
past animated many contacts between the sovereignties and the in-
surance industry, and by and large the sovereignties have been respectful
of the fact that over the years since the Armstrong Report there has been
a development of social and business philosophy characterized by a con-
sciousness of trusteeship which is the earmark of the management of most
of the great life insurance companies today.27 This newly developed
24. Id. at (g), (h).
25. 102 Cong. Rec. 6321 (daily ed. April 26, 1956).
26. "One of the consequences of our federalism is a legal system that derives from both
the Nation and the States as separate sources of authority and is administered by state and
federal judiciaries, functioning in far more subtle combination than is readily perceived!' Hart
& Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System, Preface (1953).
27. See, e.g., Dowling, Congress and Insurance, Proceedings of the Section of Insurance
Law of the American Bar Association 232 (1955); Knovlton, Jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission Over Trade Practices of Insurers, op. cit. supra at 248. See also Donovan,
Regulation of Insurance under the McCarran Act, 15 Law & Contemp. Prob. 473 (1950).
Mr. Donovan, at 491, states, "The relationship of the states and the industry is vital.
Substantial dislocation would result in a dismal countrywide panorama of public hearings,
charges, countercharges, injunctions, and writs. What are the principles which must prevail?
In last analysis the most important is that both government and industry understand that
every right is accompanied by a correlative duty. We live in an era when most talk is about
rights and little about duties. The Commissioner or executive whose xclusive concern is to
find his rights and assert them, does a grave disservice. Statutory requirements are ia-
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tradition of keen fiduciary consciousness has increased the stature of the
life insurance industry and it has resulted in immeasurable benefits to
the insuring public.
g. Regulation of Insurance Company Advertising
In 1868 it was decided in Paul v. Virginia,28 that an insurance policy
is not an article of commerce, and that, therefore, the business of in-
surance is not subject to federal regulation. In 1944 this result was
reversed in United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Association,2
in which Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting stated:
"This Court only recently recognized that certain former decisions as to the dividing
line between state and federal power were illogical and theoretically wrong, but at the
same time it announced that it would adhere to them because both governments had
accommodated the structure of their laws to the error. It seemed a commonsense
course to follow them, and I think similar considerations should restrain us from
following a contrary and destructive course now ..... 30
Immediately after the Southeastern decision, a vigorous debate ensued,
and there were many who believed that whether or not Mr. Justice
Jackson was right in urging that the courts should "accommodate the
structure of their laws" to erroneous legal theory, nevertheless a statute
should be passed to clarify for all time the views on state regulation
which he expressed. Accordingly, in 1945, the very next year after the
Southeastern decision, Congress enacted, and the President signed,
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, or so-called "Public Law #15",3 1 man-
ifestly intending to crystallize dissenting views such as those of Mr.
Justice Jackson into statutory law.
On April 27, 1956, the Federal Trade Commission by a 3 to 2 decision
(or vote of 3 to 3, if we could count the ballot of the Commission's
examiner) in Matter of the American Hospital and Life Insurance Com-
pany,32 decided that it could pry between the lines of the McCarran Act
portant, but equally important is awareness of the principle as a necessary rule of conduct
for fair play. The Commissioner may have the right to issue an order, but he has a duty not
to do so until he has given to those affected fair notice and an opportunity to be heard.
The insurer may have the right by 'flash filing' to issue a policy which cannot be set
aside, but it has the duty not to do so when it knows that indefensible discrimination will
result. Government and industry meet only through men. Intensive state regulation of an
interstate industry presents tremendous human problems, delicate and taxing. They will
be resolved only by good faith, an appreciation of the problems faced by the other man,
and fairness blessed with a touch of charity."
28. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
29. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
30. Id. at 589.
31. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1011 ff (1955).
32. - F.T.C. -, 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ff25,954 (1956).
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and establish in the Federal Government a control over insurance that,
in the light of the statute as written, the common man cannot understand
and the common lawyer cannot justify.
The opinion of the majority of the Commission in the American
Hospital case is a clear overreaching by the federal sovereignty. Any
fair reading of the McCarran Act indicates that by it Congress has
deliberately subjected the business of insurance to the laws of the several
states and specifically excluded interference by the Federal Trade Com-
mission unless the insurance business "is not regulated by state law. '
The strained advocacy of the majority opinion unfortunately makes
one look askance at the six volume report of the Federal Trade Com-
mission on the status of state regulation of insurance, even though it is an
objective study properly undertaken to determine the extent of the
Commission's responsibilities.34
33. See Dowling, Congress and Insurance, Proceedings of the Section of Insurance Law
of the American Bar Association 232, at 233 (1955). Cf. Anderson, Extra-territorial Opera-
tion of Insurance Regulatory Statutes, Proceedings of the Section of Insurance Law of the
American Bar Association 250 (1954).
34. The majority opinion itself recognizes that a state can revoke an insurance corpora-
tion's charter or license. Further, it admits that under the police power a state can take
action having consequences in other jurisdictions, and the Federal Trade Commizzion could
not prohibit such regulation. Finally it concedes, at ff 35,842 that "the test and history of the
MIcCarran-Ferguson Act leave no doubt that the power of the states to tax or to fix rates
for insurance companies doing business within their territories vas in no way to be in-
validated, impaired or superseded by federal law."
The overreaching of the majority opinion in the American Hospital case reaches its
apogee in its citation of Commonwealth v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), as supporting
its contention. Commonwealth v. Nelson squarely held that the federal government has the
sole power to punish sedition. There is in one of its preliminary paragraphs the sentence
quoted in a footnote to the majority opinion in the American Hospital case, to the effect
that the states are not prevented from prosecuting where the same act constitutes both a
federal and a state offense under the police power.
But for all practical purposes, there is no such situation in the field of sedition whatever
and the Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Nelson squarely so indicates. The fields of
sedition and insurance are not at all comparable. That of sedition is occupied by federal
statute. Insurance could be a matter of federal cognizance, but the McCarran Act turned
it back to the states. There is no comparable statute that turns the regulation of sedition
back to the states. To cite the case of Commonwealth v. Nelson for the contention of the
majority's opinion in the American Hospital case, is to cite it improperly, as is manifest
from Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Nelson, at 500, 501, 504.
In the supplemental dissenting opinion of Commissioner Mason in the American Hospital
case, emphasis is placed upon the importance of following the directive of Congress in giving
to the states control of the insurance business. Commissioner Mason particularly points out
that the following matters are matters for state rather than federal supervision: (a) in-
surance companies' advertising, (b) approval of policy forms, (c) establishment of rates, (d)
maintenance of reserves, (e) regulation of agency commissions, and (f) "the countless
other components of the internal management of any single company or companies."
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
II. THE ESSENCE OF SOVEREIGNTY-THE SUPREMACY OF THE PEOPLE
To the English philosopher, Thomas E. Hobbes, in 1651, there was
no such thing as popular sovereignty. He conceived the state as "an
artificial man", and "of greater stature and strength than the natural",
wholly supreme over the natural man, even though it was for his pro-
tection and defense that the "Leviathan" state was intended."5
Other philosophers have been emphatic that sovereignty is and
necessarily must be in the people, that even kings are the servants of the
sovereign people; that "the King is under God and the law"; and that
each man who makes up the commonalty of man has rights. Some
philosophers went so far as to expound the doctrine that if these rights
were violated even by a person calling himself with a royal name that
person usurped sovereignty and was worthy of death."0
Alexander Hamilton wrote that the judicial power is a brake on legisla-
tive power; and that this does not imply superiority on the part of the
judiciary: but
" . . . only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both; and that where
the will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the
people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter
(the Constitution) rather than the former (the statutes)." 3
This "revolutionary doctrine" is built into the Declaration of Inde-
pendence in the sentences which state that all men "are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights" and that "Governments are in-
stituted among men deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed."
The complexities of federalism lead to philosophical and constitutional
problems in which black and white are frequently blended into many
shades of gray. It serves no useful purpose here to catalogue all of the
permutations and combinations of legal difficulty which are presented
by the existence of the forty-nine sovereignties. Suffice it to suggest in
paraphrase the thought back of a sentence written in 1874:
"While each (federal sovereignty and state sovereignty) should firmly maintain the
35. Everyman's Edition, Leviathan 1, 143 (1950). See Leviathan Bound-Sovereign Im-
munity in a Modem World, address by William Harvey Reeves, prepared for delivery at the
International Bar Association, Oslo, Norway, July 23-28, 1956. Cf. United States v. Maurice,
26 Fed. Cas. 1211, No. 15747, at 1216 (C.C.D. Va. 1823); 1 Blackstone, Commentaries,
c. 18; Republic of China v. National City Bank, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
36. "No man shall attack another in his home, neither the king nor any other man.
If the king does this, the arrow shall be sent forth through all the shires, and (men shall)
go upon him and slay him, if they are able to seize him; and if he escapes he shall never
be allowed to return to the land." Larson, The Earliest Norwegian Laws: The Frostathing
278 (1935).
37. The Federalist No. 78, at 398, (Beloff ed. 1948) (Hamilton).
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essential powers belonging to it, it cannot be forgotten that the coordinate parts con-
stitute one brotherhood whose common trust requires a mutual toleration of the
occupancy of what seems to be a 'common because of vicinage' bordering the domains
of each." 3s
And then to recall the language of the 10th Amendment to the Consti-
tution:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the pcople."-
This explicit recognition of the supremacy of the people re-echoes
the ancient doctrine of the "inalienability of sovereignty". 0
III. THE EQUILIBRIUM OF POLA iTY BETWEEN THE STATE AND
THE FEDERAL
Quite apart from situations in which a constitutional design calls for
a joint administration of a concept by the federal nation and a state (for
example, the Prohibition Laws), the general impression gained from a
reading of the cases is that much apparent inconsistency is saved
by recourse to the doctrine of polarity.
Polarity is defined as "the mutual dependence of opposing principles",
i.e., the mutual attraction and concurrent mutual repulsion of opposing
forces. As they mutually attract and repel, they ultimately gravitate
into stable relationship, which prevents the equivalent of nuclear ex-
plosion and chaos.41 Emerson, in his Essay on Compensation, said long
ago:
"Polarity, or action and reaction, we meet in every part of nature. ... Though no
checks to a new evil appear, the checks exist, and will appear. If the government
38. Brown v. Turner, 70 N.C. 93, 102 (1874).
39. U.S. Const. Amend. X.
40. See Resenberg, Inalienability of Sovereignty in Medieval Political Thought (196).
41. ..... the principle of polarity should help us to avoid both the identification of law
with justice and also their complete divorce. To say that the law is always just is to do
violence to the fact that all sorts of outrageous villains and villainies have propered under
it while some of our noblest heroes have had to revolt against it. That in the long run
justice will triumph in the law is a matter of faith not of knowledge." Cohen, My Phi-
losophy of Law, in Credos of Sixteen American Scholars 41 (1941).
Similarly Professor Paul A. Freund in his Foreword to Powell, Vagaries and Varieties
in Constitutional Interpretation IX (1955) stated: "The antinoniles of constitutional law
will yield to the principle of polarity, which finds elements of validity in opposed proposi-
tions and seeks to harmonize them through judgment in a particular context."
In Republic of China v. National City Bank, 348 U.S. 356, 360 (1955) the Court stated:
"The claims of dominant opinion rooted in sentiments of justice and public morality are
among the most powerful shaping-forces in lawmaking by courts. Legislation and ad-
judication are interacting influences in the development of law. A steady legitlaive trend,
presumably manifesting a strong social policy, properly makes demands on the judicial
process." This is but polarity between the legislative and the judicial.
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is cruel, the governor's life is not safe. If you tax too high, the revenue will yield
nothing. If you make the criminal code sanguinary, juries will not convict. If the
law is too mild, private vengeance comes in. If the government is a terrific democracy,
the pressure is resisted by an over-charge of energy in the citizen, and life glows with
a fiercer flame." 4 2
The cases readily yield glimpses of philosophical polarity at work in
the federal-state system.
One interesting recent decision is that of United Automobile Workers
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board.43 There the Supreme Court
held that an act of Congress will not be interpreted so as to leave a state
powerless to avert emergencies involving fear or loss occasioned by
coercion and destruction without compelling directions to such effect. An
order of the State Labor Relations Board had been issued and it was
enforced by the Wisconsin Circuit Court and the State Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of the United States held, however, that while the
company under review was subject to the NLRB, nevertheless the NLRB
was not the exclusive method of controlling violence, even against em-
ployees. "The state interest in law and order precludes such interpreta-
tion. . . . The states are the natural guardians of the public against
violence. It is the local communities that suffer most from the fear and
loss occasioned by coercion and destruction. We would not interpret an
Act of Congress to leave them powerless to avert such emergencies with-
out compelling directions to that effect. We hold that Wisconsin may
enjoin the violent union conduct here involved. '44
In a dissenting opinion the Chief Justice and Justices Douglas and Black
observed "We retreat from Garner . . . and open the door to unseemly
conflicts between state and federal agencies when we sustain what Wis-
consin has done here."'46  Nevertheless the Court did "retreat". The
suggestion is ventured that the Supreme Court retreated in order not to
upset the equilibrium of polarity between the state and the federal. In
other words, the preservation of such equilibrium is vital to our national
welfare, and decisions such as that in the American Hospital case should
not be allowed to destroy it.
IV. INSURANCE AGAINST THE OVERREACHING OF SOVEREIGNTY:
CARRY THE CASE TO THE PEOPLE AND TO THE LEGISLATURE
The basic concept of the insurance business over the years has been
indemnity against loss and hardship. And no one is more solidly the
object or beneficiary of insurance than the common man. Hence when
42. Emerson, Essays, 1st Series 96 (1876).
43. 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
44. Id. at 272.
45. Id. at 276.
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sovereignty overreaches, the recourse of the industry and of the bar
generally should be back to the people and to their representatives in the
legislature.
The author ventures to suggest the following specific subjects for im-
mediate legislative action:
1. The majority opinion in the American Hospital case should be met
head on by an amendment to the McCarran Act.
One possible amendment would be along the line of that incorporated
in the Walter Bill.46 That bill would have made the federal anti-trust
laws and related laws completely inapplicable to the insurance business.
But Congress did not enact the Walter Bill. Instead, in the following
year, it passed the McCarran Act. Since the Federal Trade Commission,
however, by the majority decision in the American Hospital case in 1956,
has attempted its bizarre gloss upon the statute, it may well be that Con-
gress will be quick to make assurance doubly sure by spelling out the
language of the statute explicitly.
2. There should be a re-examination of the laws by which the State of
New York regulates out-of-state activities of out-of-state insurance com-
panies. Complaint has been made that New York has been overzealous
in the extent to which it has exercised its police power in the protection
of its own citizens by the imposition of far-reaching conditions precedent
to the operation in New York State by out-of-state life insurance com-
panies.4 7 In the limitation of expenses of such companies, New York
has even dealt with the pattern of commission payments which such
companies must follow in other states in the sale of insurance to citizens
of other states through agents resident in other states. 8 There is doubt
that such detailed extra-territorial regulation bears any close relationship
to the financial ability of those out-of-state companies to meet their
obligations in New York. As Mr. Anderson has stated," . . . as this
national regulation of insurance by New York is extended further, it
becomes a serious threat to our system of state supervision." 2
3. Support should be given to legislation which will substantially
reduce the oppressive taxes now borne by insurance.
The general federal and state statistics, which indicate how crushing
are the tax burdens upon life insurance, have been noted above. The
generality can be made most striking by a specific example:
Had I the good fortune to be a citizen of Texas and to invest $100 in out-of-state life
insurance protection for my small family, Texas would require over three dollars
46. H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).
47. See, e.g. Anderson, supra note 33.
48. N.Y. Insurance Law §§ 213, 213a.
49. Anderson, supra note 33, at 260.
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of my $100 to be paid to the State Treasury by way of gross premium tax. This pay-
ment represents a direct increase in the cost to me of my life insurance. Over a thirty
year period that increase in cost amounts to one full annual premium. The tax is a
recurring one, which has to be repaid during every single year of the life of the
policy.
This homely example serves to point up the startling fact that when
life insurance company taxes are increased by millions of dollars such
increases, at least in participating insurance, are going to be paid out
of the pockets of the policyholders, to whom life insurance is a savings
mechanism. And that is true for both state taxation and federal taxation
as well. Inevitably, taxes are going to be paid out of funds available for
the distribution of dividends to mutual policyholders. Is it not dis-
criminatory to tax such savings when there is no comparable tax on the
savings bank balances of individual depositors in savings banks?
Further, the effect of overtaxation upon the private purses of the men
and women who are stockholders of insurance companies is going to be
drastic. It needs no actuary to draw this conclusion, in view of the figures
cited above to the effect that a decade ago the total amount collected by
the states alone upon only life insurance premiums was about half the
sum of approximately $189 million collected by the states in such taxes
in 1955. These figures were with respect to life insurance premiums alone
and did not include taxes on fire insurance premiums, casualty insurance
premiums, workmen's compensation premiums or any other kind of in-
surance premiums. Nor did they include any taxes on real estate or any
licenses or fees.
We need not labor the obvious. It is imperative to the industry and to
all its clients that at the very next legislative sessions insurance be granted
ample tax relief.
CONCLUSION
Other flaws in the tax laws and in laws affecting the insurance industry
and its clients will readily come to mind, whether in the fields of stock
investments, acquisition of real estate, welfare plans, the taxation of life
insurance companies, or otherwise. Such flaws are instances of the over-
reaching of sovereignty, whether witting or unwitting. Insurance against
such overreaching is to be found in recourse to the people and to their
legislative representatives. The time to act is now.
